Leadership Analysis: Ahmed al-Sharaa (al-Julani)

Overview:

Ahmed al-Sharaa, more commonly known as al-Julani, is now the president of Syria being elected at the Syrian Revolution Victory Conference on January 29^th, 2025. Formerly leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and A leader within al-Nusra front. Sharaa also fought against the American invasion and occupation in Iraq after a brief stent in university studying media and faculty of medicine.

Childhood

Born 29^th October 1982 in Riyadh, Saudia Arbia Sharaa enjoyed a middle class upbringing. His father worked as an Oil Engineer at the Saudi Ministry of Oil and his mother was a geography teacher. At the age of seven him and his family would move back to Damascus, Syria, his father would open up a real estate company. While living in the Hazzan neighborhood in Damascus he began to go to the Shafi’i Madhhab, one of four schools of Islamic Jurisprudence within Sunni Islam. At the age of seventeen his enrollment was a signal to his religious conviction in Sunni Islam, the school would most certainly influence his political, religious and moral viewpoint. According to Hussam Jazmati who produced one of the most definitive biographies on Julani, he was not a remarkable student. In an interview with frontline in 2021, al-Julani would state that he and his father had ideological differences, but they shared the same beliefs on Palestine. Al-Julani stated that the second Palestinian intifada in 2000 was when he became politically motivated. Stating “I could fulfil my duties, defending a people who are oppressed by occupiers and invaders.”

Iraq 2003-2011 Beginnings of Jihad

In 2003, Julani transferred from Damascus to Baghdad weeks before the invasion of Iraq. Joining al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) Julani quickly rose through the ranks of the organization though public sector information on how is not readily available. His rise through the ranks Is documented from his detention in Camp Bucca from his capture in 2005 his fight in Iraq initially only lasted around two years. Camp Bucca is renowned as one of the breeding grounds for major terrorist leaders, the leader of ISIS, al-Baghdadi was also held in the facility and from there built a terrorist network that would eventually become ISIS. It would be assumed that here is where Julani would formulate strategies, share ideas and foster relationships that would lead him to being the future leader of al-Nusra, and eventually HTS. It is known that whilst there Julani began researching Assads regime, formulating a plan on how to create an al-Qaeda like group within the country. He was then released when the camp closed in 2009 and was made a commander within AQI by order of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi leader of AQI and eventually ISIS. Not much is known from when the camp closed in 2009 to 2011 but with his status as a commander it is assumed he was developing leadership and military political skills within AQI’s network making a name for himself.

Syria 2011-2013 Julani’s al-Nusra Front

On orders from al-Baghdadi, Julani would travel from Iraq to Syria at the beginning of the Arab spring to start an al-Qaeda linked group within the country to leverage the current political instability within the country. Julani would go on to found Jabhat al-Nusra or Nusra Front an AQI and ISIS linked group whose fundamentals were to usher in the kind of Islamic Jurisprudence he studied at the Shafi’i Madhhab in Damascus. Al-Nusra (AN) would try the same tactics that al-Zawahiri used and wrote on in his doctrine, imbedding themselves within an already existing insurgency they went undetected by the US State Department for nearly two years before being designated as a terrorist organization. Under Julani the group would leverage local populaces within the war torn country and provide certain services to the locals winning the public opinion war. From the beginning Julani would not affiliate himself nor the group with al-Qaeda letting public opinions on the group be swayed in their favor. Nusra’s leader, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, quickly established a capable organization, which secured its own donors in the Persian Gulf, collected revenue from taxation and asset seizures in the territories under its control, became adept at conducting insurgent attacks, and attracted a growing number of fighters, making it one of the most powerful groups within Syria. In 2013 al-Baghdadi sought to publicly bring al-Nusra under its wing with a public announcement of the merger resulting in Julani putting out a public statement rejecting the merger.

Syria 2013-2017

Julani’s audio recording in 2013 was the first such public statement he made, separating himself and group from ISIS. Julani didn’t separate himself from ISIS due to religious or political reasons the Salafi Islamist groups had many commonalties, the main reason for the split was power and who would control Syria. Julain made clear in this interview his harsh interpretations of Shria law would be implemented in the territories he controlled and there would be no room for religious minorities such as Shia, Christians, Druzes and Alawites, we now see this is Syria with conflicts from his HTS and Alawite and Druze factions supported by Israel. Instances of ethnic cleansing and human rights violations have been attributed to the group. The January 2012 al-Midan bombing killing 26 and wounding 63 more, along with the 2015 killing of Druze villagers in the Qalb Loze Massacre. Additional bombings in Damascus killed an additional 130 people. Nusra’s initial strategy of separating itself from ISIS may have been the key to its survival. If al-Nusra had in fact been affiliated with and joined ISIS, they most certainly would have gone down with the caliphate. It is debatable to say weather or not Julani anticipated this demise of ISIS. He certainly knew Baghdadi, he would have had knowledge relating to what the plans of ISIS were, but it would be ill of me to say he foresaw the downfall of ISIS. Despite its split with ISIS which was AQI, Nusra Front kept its relationship with al-Qaeda. In late July of 2016 Julani would disband Nusra Front and rebranded the group as Fatah al-Sham, though not consulting al-Zawahiri, it is said this created tensions between the groups, however backdoor relations continued.

Syria 2017-2020

In late January 2017, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham rebranded yet again when it merged with several other groups Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki, Liwa al-Haq, Jaysh al-Sunna, and Jabhat Ansar al-Din to establish HTS.

August 2018 Julani’s Three Stage Approach

Julani who now controlled a large and capable army in Syria began offensive operations, his plan was a three stage plan to stabilize and cement his group in Syria. Step one of this plan was to liberate the towns of Fu’a and Kafriya from Iranian militias. Stage two of the operation would be to combat the Islamic State which he saw as a threat to stability. Stage three was to entrench himself and his army in the North giving themselves a stronghold to launch and repel attacks from. Though not publicly stated the reasoning for controlling and firmly seating himself in the north would be to receive help from Turkey. In 2018 figures show he had nearly 15,000 fighters at his disposal during this time.

March 2020 Ceasefire

A ceasefire in Syria resulting from Russian and Turkish delegations resulted in a major gain for HTS. HTS was being pounded by Russian and Syrian aircraft and artillery. This break in fighting singled the time for HTS to begin its rebuilding stage and Julani would use this to incorporate more groups into his allying factions in northern Syria. HTS during this time reduced its focused on conflict and sought peace with rival groups and also sough to provide services and rebuild the areas that they had taken and now controlled.

Idlib Gouvernante The Beginning and The End 2020-2025

Under Julani’s rule Idlib became one of the most prosperous regions In Syria, rivaling even Damascus for its quality of living standards. Educational facilities were built though the schools wee segregated more that 18,000 students attended. Before moving on to further developments within Syria its important to circle back. The 2020 ceasefire that made all this possible, not just his governance of Idlib possible but his eventual takeover of all of Syria. The 2020 ceasefire allowed the Russians to confidently begin to pull troops and resources out of Syria. In 2022 Russian forces seriously began to pull troops from the region citing that the reserves from its contingency in Russia will be pulled to help aide its fight with Ukraine. This ceasefire and the beginning of the War in Ukraine was the catalyst that let Julani take the offensive and reclaim Damascus, though the Russians cited their reason for not giving support to the Assad regime as the regime soldiers refused to fight an argument can be made that they simply didn’t have the resources nor the soldiers to conduct an effective defense.

It is in my opinion that Julani was able to rapidly advance and capture Damascus so fast due to the lack of a Russian presence nearing the boarder with Idlib. The Iranian Militias in the region could have put up a decent fight against the rebels but without the Russian air assets its debatable how they would have contended with the rebels. Another reason I believe is the Iranians had been embroiled with a conflict with the Israelis up till the point where HTS made their move. Iranian backed militias had oved forces from Idlib province to the south and the east to be closer to the fighting in Israel.